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The concept of common good occupied a relevant place in the classical social, political and 
economic philosophy, then lost ground in the modern age, and has recently reappeared, 
although with different and sometimes confusing meanings. This paper is the draft of a chapter 
of a handbook; it explains the meaning of common good in the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
philosophy and in the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church, why is it relevant and how is it 
different of the other uses of the term in the liberal and liberal-welfarist, communitarian and 
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In current ethical and political discourse, the common good is often a rhetorical concept, 
defined in very diverse ways. It had a prominent place in the political and social philosophy of 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, then lost ground when Western philosophy took an 
individualistic turn, and with the predominance of multiculturalism, which excludes any 
unitary conception of the good, but continued to be one of the main pillars of Catholic social 
teaching (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2004, no. 160). It returned to relevance in 
view of the modern manifestations of totalitarianism and other developments in recent decades, 
as a response to questions such as, is it possible to have a politics founded on a universal 
morality? Can there be a univocal notion of good in a multicultural world? Is a welfare state 
that combines economic prosperity with equality viable? 
In Catholic social teaching the common good is defined as “the sum total of social conditions 
which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more fully and 
more easily” (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2004, no. 164). This is a widely accepted 
definition that we can take as a starting point. 
In this article we shall focus on the doctrine of the common good in the personalist tradition 
(Maritain, 1966), which starts with Plato and Aristotle and continues with Thomas Aquinas and 
Catholic social teaching. Following a brief review of the historical background, we shall discuss 
the relationship between the common good and human sociability, and between private goods 
and the common good, to then explain how the common good is built in a society. After that, 
we shall describe other conceptions of the common good, ending with the conclusions. 
The Common Good in the History of Thought 
In the classical or Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, the notion of the common good relates the 
good of people insofar as they are part of a community to the good of the community insofar 
as it is oriented toward the people that are its members. For Aristotle, the formation of any 
community requires a common good, because “the end of the city is living well… It is to be 
assumed, therefore, that the object of the political community is good actions, not only life in 
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common” (1984a, III, 9, 1280b-1281a). For that reason the common good is constituted first of 
all by virtue, that is, by that which in a positive and stable way develops human beings in 
accordance with their nature. 
Thomas Aquinas (1981, 1997) revived Aristotelian theory. The common good acquires its 
meaning in governance: “to govern is to lead what is governed to its appropriate end” (1997, 
Book II, c. 3). The purpose of man is to contemplate and enjoy the highest of goods, God. The 
common good therefore has both a supernatural dimension and a temporal dimension, which 
coincides with what society needs in order to live in a good way. 
In modern times, the concept of the common good was cut off from that tradition, and so there 
appeared a range of positions, from individualistic liberalism (the good of society yields to that 
of the individual) to collectivism (society is an entity in its own right, with a collective good 
that is different from and higher than the good of its members). 
In the 20th century, the flourishing of Thomism gave new prominence to the concept of the 
common good. Maritain (1966) contrasts his “personalist” conception with “bourgeois 
individualism”, “communist anti-individualism”, and “totalitarian or dictatorial anti-communist 
anti-individualism”. The human person is part of a community and, in that sense, is 
subordinate to the community, but the person is much more than a member of the community, 
because he has a transcendent dimension, so that society must have the person as its end. 
In the second half of the 20th century, the Second Vatican Council (1965, no. 26) stated clearly 
that the person is the subject, the root, the beginning and the end of all social life and all social 
institutions. Within the personalist tradition, Karol Wojtyla (John Paul II) developed the thesis 
that the person is naturally social, not only by necessity but on account of his ontological 
plenitude. In Sollicitudo rei socialis (John Paul II, 1987), he proposed the articulation between 
solidarity and the common good, describing solidarity as “the firm and persevering 
determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say, to the good of all and of 
each individual, because we are all really responsible for all” (no. 38). 
The Encyclical Caritas in Veritate (Benedict XVI, 2009) has prompted renewed consideration of 
the common good as an ordering principle of economic life. “The exclusively binary model of 
market-plus-State is corrosive of society” (no. 39); what is needed is “increasing openness, in a 
world context, to forms of economic activity marked by quotas of gratuitousness and 
communion” (no. 39). The introduction of the “logic of gift”, not only in civil society but also 
in the market and the State, thus opens new horizons for the role of the common good. “This is 
not merely a matter of a “third sector”, but of a broad new composite reality embracing the 
private and public spheres, one which does not exclude profit, but instead considers it a means 
for achieving human and social ends” (no. 46). And this promotes consideration of the common 
good in the “category of relation” (no. 53), because “relationality is an essential element” of the 
“humanum” (no. 55). 
Sociability and the Common Good 
Human beings always seek the good (Aristotle, 1984b, I.1) – goods of all kinds, material or 
otherwise – and that seeking takes place in society. They need society not only to satisfy their 
needs but, above all, to develop as persons. Sociability is not a whim, an instinct or a 
constraint, but a property that flows from the nature of the person. 
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Society does not arise from a contract by which individuals surrender part of their freedom to 
the group in order to guarantee their protection and avoid conflict. It is not a mere aggregate of 
persons, yet it has no nature of its own independent of that of its members. Society’s members 
are like the parts of a whole, but not in the way the arm is part of the body, as the arm cannot 
survive if separated from the body, whereas man retains his personality intact when separated 
from society. 
If society is not a mere aggregate of subjects, it must have an end –its common good– which 
cannot be reduced to the particular good of its members. The centrality of the person demands 
that the end of society include the good of individuals, each and every one. There is, therefore, 
a good of the person and a good of society, which do not coincide but are related to one 
another. A person seeks his personal good because he cannot desire anything that he does not 
see as a good for himself; but he also seeks it in society. It would be a contradiction if he were 
able to achieve his own good at the expense of, or even outside of, the common good. Society, 
in turn, has its own good, which is common to all its members but is not the sum of their 
personal good. Being common, it cannot be the good of some, nor even the majority; rather, it 
is the good of all and of each one, at the same time and for the same reason. 
It is very unlikely, however, that the members of a diversified community will all have the same 
conception of what their common good is. Does this mean that the common good cannot be 
realized? Not if the members of that community are aware that they can achieve their particular 
good only within the community; that serving the good of the community is a precondition for 
achieving their personal good; and that, therefore, they must contribute to the good of the other 
members of society – not to the particular good of each one but to the good that the community 
provides to them. The cooperation and participation of each person in the common good closes 
the gap between the pursuit of the good of each individual and the pursuit of the common good. 
The common good is thus “the aim of the “good life” with and for others in just institutions” 
(Ricoeur, 1992, p. 202). The idea of the common good is close to that of the “structures of living 
together” that provide the conditions in which individual lives can flourish. “The common good 
is… the good of the relations themselves between people, bearing in mind that such relations 
are understood as a good for all those who participate in them” (Zamagni, 2007, p. 23). 
The common good is indivisible because the good that benefits each person cannot be separated 
from the good of others. It cannot be appropriated by any one of society’s members; all have 
access to it. The goods that make up the common good are present as the foundation of all the 
actions of society’s members; but they transcend the immediate ends of each action. Society’s 
members seek those goods, probably unconsciously, in all their actions, but the goods 
themselves are not the result of specific actions. 
Earlier we defined the common good as “the sum total of social conditions which allow people, 
either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more fully and more easily” 
(Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2004, no. 164). This is a widely cited definition, yet it 
is not entirely correct, as it presents the common good not as an end in itself but as an 
instrument for the good of individuals or groups. It does not reflect the fact that the common 
good is not only the good that is common to the people who live in a community but also the 
good of the community itself. 
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Private Goods and the Common Good 
Economists distinguish among three types of goods: private goods (they are excludable: one 
can prevent its use by another person, and rival: the use by one person can reduce or prevent 
the use by another; for example, an ice-cream), public goods (non-excludable: they are 
available to several people, and non-rival: the use by one person does not reduce the use by 
another; the national defense, for example), and common resources (non-excludable but rival: 
the fish in a lake). What we call here the common good is not another category of economic 
goods, although it is related to them. 
The relationship between the common good and private goods is often presented in terms of 
confrontation, as if the pursuit of the second were incompatible with the pursuit of the first, or 
as if the good of society were a burden to individuals. But that is not the case. The key to 
understanding their relationship is that “the beginning, the subject and the goal of all social 
institutions is and must be the human person” (Second Vatican Council, 1965, no. 25). The goal 
of the political community is the good of the person, insofar as the person is a part of the 
community. Yet the good of the person is not opposed to the good of society but is part of it. 
The common good therefore takes precedence over the particular good, where the goods are of 
the same or a higher kind (Aquinas, 1981, II-II, q. 152, a. 4 ad 2). This is not for any 
quantitative reason (e.g., because the common good is the good of more people), but because 
the common good is the good of the whole of which the individual is part. It is not opposed to 
the pursuit of private interests as such but to the pursuit of private interests at the expense of 
the common good, turning the common good into an instrument for the particular good. In 
short, the tension between personal good and common good is resolved dynamically: a person 
has a duty to achieve the good for himself, but he can only achieve his own good if he also 
achieves the good of society, which is oriented to the person. Moreover, this is not the good of 
“others” – a good that a person must seek because of some altruistic imperative – nor, clearly, 
the good of the State. 
Just as society is not given but is somehow “constructed” by all its members, the common good 
also is built by the members of society. It arises from the common activity of all and is enjoyed 
by all. It is a shared good, not only because everybody shares in it but above all because it 
“overflows” from each person to the rest. 
How the Common Good Is Built 
The concept of the common good, as stated here, seems of little use if the aim is to specify the 
conditions of life that individuals and communities consider most appropriate to achieve their 
goal. And as the abstract good does not move people to act, it is important that we more clearly 
specify its content. Maritain (1966, pp. 52-53) states the issue as follows: 
1)  “(t)hat which constitutes the common good of a political society is not only: the 
collection of public commodities and services – the roads, ports, schools, etc. – 
which the organization of common life presupposes; a sound fiscal condition of the 
state and its military power; the body of just laws, good customs and wise 
institutions, which provide the nation with its structure; the heritage of its great 
historical remembrances, its symbols and its glories; its living traditions and 
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cultural treasures.” Here, Maritain identifies the sum of social conditions that make 
it possible for the members of society to realize their goals. 
2)  “The common good […] includes also […] the sum or sociological integration of all 
the civic conscience, political virtues, and sense of right and liberty, of all the 
activity, material prosperity and spiritual riches, of unconsciously operative 
hereditary wisdom, of moral rectitude, justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and 
heroism in the individual life of its members. For these things all are, in a certain 
measure, communicable and so revert to each member, helping him to perfect his 
life of liberty and person. They all constitute the good human life of the multitude.” 
These sentences point to the sum of the aids that society provides to its members. 
3)  To the previous two sets of elements we must add the harmonious integration of all 
these elements into a whole (Maritain, 1951, p. 10). 
The common good therefore obviously cannot be defined statistically, in terms of a country’s 
wealth, consumption or another economic variable. Material goods are part of the common 
good insofar as they make the common good possible, as well as other goods like truth, beauty, 
peace, art, culture, freedom, tradition and so on. All these can be “common goods” that define 
in some way the abstract and transcendent concept of the common good. 
As Maritain suggests, the common good is not a single good but is made up of an interwoven 
set of goods of varying scope and on different levels. It is not a precise institutional project, nor 
is it the result of a predetermined objective assessment of what is good for human nature. Nor 
is the common good a subsidy that society offers to its members (like the welfare state), much 
less a burden that is imposed on them. 
It is the task of the State to enable and promote the common good, but not to define it nor, 
therefore, to impose specific content that might realize it. Nor is it the task of the market, 
through the impersonal forces of the “invisible hand”. 
What we have said here regarding the common good of the polis applies equally to the different 
types of communities, as “no expression of social life – from the family to intermediate social 
groups, associations, enterprises of an economic nature, cities, regions, States, up to the 
community of peoples and nations – can escape the issue of its own common good, in that this 
is a constitutive element of its significance and the authentic reason for its very existence” 
(Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2004, no. 165). Every community at every moment in 
history must find its common good. But this is not to say that there is no universal common 
good, because all individuals and all smaller communities are part of larger communities, up to 
the whole of humanity in time and space. 
Other Conceptions of the Common Good 
As we said earlier, the concept of the common good has been addressed from different 
philosophical positions. Here we shall discuss 1) philosophical and political liberalism, 2) 
welfare liberalism, 3) communitarianism, 4) totalitarianism, and 5) the capability approach. 
1)  With the advent of modernity, the individual became the center of attention of social 
and political ethics. The main characteristic of the self-sufficient individual is the 
ability to choose the means to achieve ends that are not an integral part of his “self”. 
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Here, society is a rational project – a social contract between subjects who have their 
own conceptions of what is good. Morality is a product of individual choices, which 
cannot be judged by external criteria. The organization of society therefore does not 
depend on the concept of good, which is replaced by the concept of rights. People’s 
moral or religious points of view play no relevant role in this society. 
Classical political liberalism relies on the free market – ruled by self-interest – and a 
minimal State to achieve social goals. For its conservative and libertarian branches 
(Nozick, 1988), the common good or general interest is determined in a consensual way 
as the sum of the private goods chosen by the citizens according to their utility 
functions; in a utilitarian spirit, it is the greatest good for the greatest number. And the 
role of the State is to promote the well-being of citizens and protect their freedom. 
2)  Welfare liberals today form the dominant currents in Western political thought. 
They start from the individualistic assumptions of liberalism but note that the 
agents, in trying to put their life plan into effect in the context of the free market, 
have very different starting positions. It is the task of the ethically neutral State to 
guarantee and distribute equitably the freedoms and resources that individuals need 
in order to lead the lives they have freely chosen. Hence the centrality of the 
concept of justice (Rawls, 1971). 
Besides the realization of the personal good of the agents, the concept of the 
common good also includes certain social outcomes, in terms of equality, leveling 
of starting conditions, and provision of a universal welfare state. The market is the 
sphere of efficiency and wealth creation, whereas the State is the sphere of 
solidarity and redistribution; as the two spheres are ultimately incompatible, there 
will always be clashes between the two. 
3)  In political debate, communitarians are above all critical of liberalism. The person is 
not a self-sufficient being, separated from the community, concerned only for his 
particular interest and endowed with certain basic rights and freedoms that are prior 
even to the definition of the social order; rather, his “self” is made up of communal 
ties, which he cannot do without. The community is much more than an aggregate 
of individuals; it becomes a moral space in which things have value insofar as the 
prevailing culture gives them meaning. 
The common good is no longer the sum of particular goods: the community is a 
common good in itself and a source of common goods for individuals. There is no 
universal common good; rather, each community has its own conception of the 
common good, which takes precedence over the good of citizens, because citizens owe 
it loyalty and commitment. It is the good of the community, not the good of individuals 
as members of the community. The State cannot be neutral. Its mission goes beyond 
guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of individuals to having its own conception of 
what is good in accordance with the values it recognizes in the community. 
4)  The concept of the common good has also been used by different types of 
totalitarianism (communism, Nazism, fascism), but in a radically different sense 
from that given it in the personalist tradition, because in totalitarianism the person 
is seen as merely a part of society, to which he is subordinate; and also because the 
totalitarian desire to impose a certain specific content of the common good on 
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citizens is opposed to the idea of a good that is both the good of the person and the 
good of society. 
It is this desire that has led authors of various tendencies to oppose the concept of 
the common good on the grounds that it is incompatible with democracy and the 
freedom of people. And the risk of totalitarianism clearly exists where the State is 
assigned the task of defining and implementing the common good. That is why the 
personalist tradition affirms that the common good is not so much a duty of the 
State as a duty of all the members of society, and that the role of the State to 
promote it, but not to define or impose it. 
5)  In both the theory and the practice of economic development, growth has been 
synonymous with an increase in the material resources of a country. The results, 
however, have been frequently insufficient, even regrettable, prompting a search for 
alternative approaches. One of the most suggestive is that of Amartya Sen, for 
whom “development can be seen… as the process of expansion of the real freedoms 
that people enjoy” (1999, p. 3). Poverty is rooted not so much in a lack of material 
means as in the absence of certain freedoms, because of the denial of certain 
“abilities to do valuable acts or reach valuable states of being”. 
Sen does not use the concept of the common good, but his focus on capabilities brings him 
close to it, albeit without coinciding. Sen understands capabilities as oriented to the freedom to 
choose, in line with liberal theories, so that the common good is not the good of the community 
as a whole and the good of its members, but only the good of the members. 
Developing the theory of capabilities, Nussbaum (1992) identifies the good that is common to 
human life with the sum of human rights, or with a list of core human capabilities. In the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, a list of human rights is not enough to define the common 
good, because those rights do not capture the full depth and wealth of the concept, although 
they are of course part of it. 
Conclusions: What Role Does the Common Good Have Today? 
The concept of the common good is far from being universally accepted, and those who use the 
concept have very different conceptions of it. When the common good is identified with a set 
of democratic freedoms or human rights, or with the generic object of social and redistributive 
policies, it is widely accepted. But when it is presented as a good that not only is shared by 
citizens but also exists in its own right, the level of acceptance declines considerably. In this 
order of things, Deneulin (2006) cites five objections that social philosophers and political 
scientists raise nowadays when discussing the Thomistic concept of the common good: 
1)  It simply amounts to recognition of the need to reach institutional agreements in 
order to promote the well-being of citizens. In other words, it is instrumental to the 
good of individuals. We already criticized this conception earlier. 
2)  If it is not instrumental, the common good becomes a tool of totalitarianism. 
However, if we accept that the common good is the good not only of society but 
also of individuals, that threat disappears. 
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3)  In practice, the common good is simply another name for the public goods that we 
hear about from economists. But those public goods are exclusive: though in 
principle available to all, when allocated to a particular user, they become reserved 
for exclusively private use. 
4)  It is another way of talking about a good that is common to human life and so is 
reduced to a list of rights that are necessary for a good human life. However, if that 
life is only personal, it does not include the common good, which also encompasses 
life in common and the structural conditions that make it possible. 
5)  It is an unrealizable concept because it is impossible in a multicultural society to 
reach agreement on the goods of which it is composed. So either the concept of the 
common good is abandoned or it is reduced to a discussion of the partial common 
goods of a particular community. But if there is no good that is shared by all 
humans by the fact of being human, we will end up separating some communities 
from others. The fact that the common good described here cannot be reduced to a 
list of realizations for politicians is, rather, a strength of this concept, because it can 
never crystallize in a defined set of structures, which would be the same negation of 
the dynamism of human good in society. 
The concept of the common good, as understood in the classical social and political philosophy 
and the Catholic social teaching, does not have wide acceptance in “secular” media. 
Nevertheless, we have already seen how the exclusive pursuit of self-interest, divorced from 
any consideration of the good of society, leads to bad results. This is perhaps why the common 
good is so much talked about today, albeit in a sense that is, to say the least, inadequate: as the 
sum of personal goods, as mere common interest, as the exercise of justice, as recognition of 
the need to account for the consequences of one’s own actions on others (what economists call 
the “externalities of action”), as an instrument of social negotiation between adversaries, and so 
on. Against all this, consideration of a rich, well-founded concept of the common good may 
help to redefine the role of politics. 
But this does not mean that putting the common good in practice is an easy task in politics. It 
demands a broad vision of the problems and taking into account the effects of the policies on 
the people and the organizations – and not only on their private interests, but also on creating 
and preserving the conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach 
their fulfillment more fully and more easily. It does not allow a concrete and detailed 
description of the common good to be imposed on the citizens. It is not monolithic: the 
common good is realized in every community as well as in the global society, in a historical, 
specific and plural way. It cannot be warranted by any political, economic or technical 
structure, unless it is based on the responsibility of the persons and the institutions. It is, 
therefore, a calling to all to take on their common responsibilities (Benedict XVI, 2009, n. 17). 
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